Abstract. Algorithms for detecting anomalous events can be divided into those that are designed to detect specific diseases and those that are non-specific in what they detect. Specific detection methods determine if patterns in the data are consistent with known outbreak diseases, as for example influenza. These methods are usually Bayesian. Non-specific detection methods attempt broadly to detect deviations from some model of the non-outbreak situation, regardless of which disease might be causing the deviation. Many frequentist outbreak detection methods are non-specific. In this paper, we introduce a Bayesian approach for detecting both specific and non-specific disease outbreaks, and we report a preliminary study of the approach.
Introduction
Detection of anomalous events in data has important applications in domains such as disease outbreak detection [1] , fraud detection [2] and intrusion detection [3] . In a typical scenario, a monitoring system examines a sequence of data to determine if any recent activity can be considered a deviation from baseline behavior. These anomalous events can be divided into two types -those that we know about and those that are unexpected. As a result, algorithms within these monitoring systems can be classified into two categories that we will refer to as specific detection algorithms and non-specific detection algorithms. A robust detection system would use a combination of detection algorithms from both of these categories.
Specific detection algorithms look for pre-defined anomalous patterns in the data. For example, in the context of disease-outbreak detection, a specific detection approach might examine health-care data for the onset of a particular disease, such as inhalational anthrax. In contrast, a non-specific detection approach would try to detect any anomalous events that are missed by the specific detectors. By combining these two approaches we might be able to obtain a hybrid approach that detects anticipated diseases well, while having the non-specific approach serve as a "safety net" that is able to detect unanticipated (and possibly never before seen) diseases. We call this combined approach a safety-net algorithm. In this paper, we describe a Bayesian safety-net algorithm for detecting disease outbreaks. While the analysis in this paper is basic, we can apply the fundamental ideas to develop much richer Bayesian safetynet models and detection algorithms.
Methodology
This section introduces an example model and describes how we use the model for outbreak detection. Due to space limitations, we are only able to present an outline of the complete method.
Let d 0 represent all the diseases that Emergency Department (ED) patients can have in the absence of any disease outbreak in the population. Let d k denote one specific outbreak disease that we know about. If we assume that there are n types of outbreak diseases, then 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Finally, we use d * to represent any unknown or unexpected outbreak disease. ) and visit the ED. We use ps i _dx to denote the values that node person_i disease can take, which represents the possible diseases that person i can have given pop_dx. For the people who do not come to the ED, we assign them the disease state called none. For a patient who comes to the ED, his or her disease state is a latent (hidden) variable.
When
is equal to the value of the fraction node by the construction of that node. If pop_dx = NOB, a specific person i either has d 0 or he/she did not come to the ED, and therefore pop_dx = none. The probability that the person has d 0 is estimated from past ED data.
Given the disease state of person i, as represented by ps i _dx, we use ps i _fd to model the state of a binary symptom of that person. The symptom state of a person is modeled using a Bernoulli distribution. It is possible to model more than one symptom, but for simplicity of presentation, we restrict this paper to an example that contains only one symptom. In particular, we consider the symptom states as being cough or no cough. For the patients that come to the ED, we define P(
In the next section we describe how we model p 0 , p k and p * under uncertainty.
The Disease Model
As stated, the model represents that a person has disease state d u , for 0 ≤ u ≤ n. Let p u denote P(ps i _df = cough | ps i _dx = d u ). We assume that p u is distributed according to a Beta distribution, namely, p u ~ Beta(α u , β u ). We assessed the parameters of these Beta distributions based on real data and expert judgments.
The Safety-Net Model
The example safety-net model introduced in this paper is designed to detect diseases that have a probability of cough, call it p * , that is not equal to p 0 , p 1 , …, p n . We will represent a distribution over p * . We use d -(d + ) to denote a hypothetical disease that has a distribution of the probability of cough that is a delta function at 0 (1). Correspondingly, p -= 0 and p + = 1. Consider every pair of known diseases being modeled, d u and d v . We consider the possibility that p * is between p u and p v , for every u and v, such that 
Inference
We wish to derive P(pop_dx | data), where data denotes the status of the symptom cough for every person in the population. We assume the status is either cough or no cough for people who come to the ED, and that it is always unknown for people who do not. We derive P(pop_dx | data) by deriving P(data | pop_dx), assessing P(pop_dx), and applying the Bayes rule. We derive P(data | pop_dx) by setting pop_dx to be one of
, and then performing inference on the Bayesian network in Fig. 1 . Inference is complicated by the fact that we have distributions over P(ps i _df | ps i _dx), as described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2; thus, inference includes integrating over these distributions.
We applied a variation of the inference method given in [4] , which is polynomial time in the number of people who come to the ED. For the detailed description of inference, please see [5] .
Preliminary Evaluation
For simplicity, we will assume that the fraction node has the value 0.0001 with probability 1; this assumption is not necessary, although it does reduce computational complexity.
Creating the Datasets
We created 20 datasets (scenarios), assuming a population size of 100,000 people. Each scenario represents data on the population for one given day of interest. In the remainder of this section, we describe how we created a scenario.
We sampled a Poisson distribution with mean λ = 90 to determine the number of people who came to the ED on the given day without any outbreak disease. For each of these people, we sampled their cough status using the distributions defined in Section 2.1.
When simulating the presence of outbreak disease d k in the population, we assumed that the value of the node fraction in Fig. 1 is 0. 0001. We assumed 100,000 × 0.0001 = 10 people had d k and came to the ED. For each of these 10 people, we sampled from the distribution of P(ps i _df = cough | ps i _dx = d k ) to determine their cough status. We then combined these 10 cases with the simulated ED cases without outbreak disease in order to create a complete dataset for the scenario.
Experimental Setup
Let d u and d v be any two of the eight CDC Category A diseases [6] To investigate the degree to which modeling the safety-net disease d * has an impact on detection performance, we made d u and d v to be all possible pairs of the eight outbreak diseases and carried out 8 × 7 = 56 sets of experiments. In each set, we computed the mean RR 1 and the mean RR 2 over the 20 scenarios, where for a given scenario RR 1 = LR(S B1 ) / LR(S A1 ) and RR 2 = LR(S A2 ) / LR(S B2 ), where
* }, and S B2 = {d v }. Our hypothesis is that usually RR 2 > RR 1 , which supports that modeling d * is doing more good than harm in detecting outbreak diseases.
Results and Discussion
Recall that the distribution of P(ps i _df = cough | ps i _dx = d k ) was assessed by a domain expert, for 1 ≤ k ≤ 8. We sorted the eight outbreak diseases by their expectations for P(ps i _df = cough | ps i _dx = d k ) in ascending order. In Tables 2, 3 Table 4 shows the P-values given different combinations of d u and d v . Notice that the P-values close to the diagonal are very big, so that we cannot reject the null hypothesis, while the P-values away from the diagonal are zeros, which rejects the null hypothesis. Table 4 provides support that modeling d * helps detect unanticipated diseases more than it interferes with detecting known diseases. 
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper introduced a Bayesian method for detecting disease outbreaks that combines a specific detection method with a non-specific method. Preliminary results provide support that this hybrid approach helps detect unexpected diseases more than it interferes with detecting known diseases. We plan to test this approach on real datasets and evaluate its detection performance using other measures, such as AMOC curves [2] .
